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The issues and the cases discussed in 
the following article were the subject of a 
Financial Institution Litigation session 
presented by the author September 25, 
2009, at the AICPA Forensic Accounting 
Conference in Orlando, FL.
A financial institution litigation 
case used to have a fairly open path 
between the initial filing and the 
green light from a court to proceed. 
Since enactment of the Private Secu­
rities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
in 1995, the path between filing a 
federal securities case in these mat­
ters and trying the case has nar­
rowed. Subsequent court decisions, 
including the three discussed in this 
article, have continued to narrow 
a path that is also becoming more 
crowded. One current result of this 
activity may be cases that are filed in 
federal court but that do not assert 
claims under federal securities laws. 
Also, more cases may be filed in state 
court for certain types of financial 
institutions (such as hedge funds) 
that may not be subject to the Secu­
rities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (SLUSA).1 A forensic 
accountant engaged to provide con­
sulting services in today’s financial 
institution litigation arena will find 
it helpful to be aware of differences 
in the allegations pled and in court 
venues. A CPA who is certified in 
financial forensics is guided by a
body of knowledge that includes the 
federal and state court systems.2
DURA
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo (Dura), 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
In its decision, the Supreme Court 
addressed a provision in PSLRA that 
said plaintiffs in securities fraud cases 
“have the burden of proving that the 
act or omission of the defendant... 
caused the loss for which the plaintiff 
seeks to recover damages.” An effect of 
the Dura decision was a need by plain­
tiffs to show a more direct link of their 
allegations to the losses being claimed.
TELLABS
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Maker Issues 
&  Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs), 551 U.S. 308 
(2007) affected how scienter3 is pled. 
Under Tellabs, a court “must consider, 
not only inferences urged by the 
plaintiff, as the Seventh Circuit did, 
but also competing inferences ratio­
nally drawn from the facts alleged. 
Any inference of fraudulent intent 
may be plausible, yet less cogent than 
other nonculpable explanations for 
the defendant’s conduct.” Further, 
the court stated that the inference of 
scienter “must be more than merely 
‘reasonab le’ or ‘perm issible’—it 
must be cogent and compelling, thus
1 The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 and a related 2006 Supreme Court case decision, 
Merrill v. Dabit, affect suits brought by more than 50 holders of stock subject to federal securities regulation.
2 See h ttp ://fvs.aicpa.org for more information about the certified in financial forensics (CFF) accreditation.
3 Scienter guilty knowledge that is sufficient to charge a person with the consequences of his or her acts.
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strong in light of other explanations. 
A complaint will survive, we hold, 
only if a reasonable person would 
deem  the inference of scienter 
cogent and at least as compelling as 
any opposing inferences one could 
draw from the factors alleged.” After 
Tellabs, the path for a new litigation 
case became a lot more complicated 
to navigate because it became easier 
to challenge the basis for alleging 
scienter.
STONERIDGE
For those cases with aspirations to 
branch out into other paths and 
include third party defendants, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2008 
on Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc. and Motorola 
Inc. (Stoneridge), 552 U.S. 148 (2008) 
was a significant event. The Supreme 
Court found that PSLRA “directed 
the SEC to prosecute aiders and abet­
tors” but it did not extend this find­
ing to a private right of action (see 
“Syllabus to the Opinion”). “Thus, 
the 10(b) [of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934] private right 
of action does not extend to aiders 
and abettors. Because the conduct 
of a secondary actor must therefore
satisfy each of the elements or pre­
conditions for 10(b) liability, the 
plaintiff must prove, as here relevant, 
reliance upon a material misrepresen­
tation or omission by the defendant.” 
The decision does not necessarily 
knock all such cases off their intended 
paths, but an aiding and abetting 
approach is not enough anymore.
WHAT'S NEXT?
Note however that Senator Specter 
has introduced Senate Bill 1551. If 
enacted, this bill would provide for a 
private right of action for aiding and 
abetting. This could effectively over­
turn the Stoneridge ruling.
So what are filers of new finan­
cial institution litigation doing? One 
answer appears to be to start down 
a very different path. Some of the 
recent hedge fund litigation cases 
may provide a preview. For exam­
ple, consider two very different cases 
brought against Banco Santander 
S.A. and others for their alleged role 
in Madoff-related investments.4 One 
case (no. 09-20215, Southern District 
of Florida) is a typical purported 
class action b rough t in federal 
court that asserts claims under fed­
eral securities laws. The other case
(no. 09 CIV 00996, Southern District 
of New York) has been brought in 
federal court against essentially the 
same defendants, and also purports 
to be a class action, but it asserts vio­
lations of common law claims such 
as negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of fiduciary duty. A possible 
reason for this difference is that 
because the latter case does not 
allege securities law claims, it would 
therefore not be subject to PSLRA, 
including its discovery stays. In addi­
tion, the case asserts an aiding and 
abetting claim against a third party 
for fiduciary duty violations, thus 
avoiding the Stoneridge lim itation 
previously discussed, which applies 
to securities law violations. It is too 
soon to predict whether such cases 
will forge a new path or get lost in a 
detour, but they are currently going 
down the road less traveled.
Sandra Johnigan, CPA/CFF, CFE, is owner 
of Johnigan, PC, Dallas, TX. Currently she 
serves on the AICPA Certified in Financial 
Forensics Credential Committee. She has 
served on the AICPA Council and the AICPA 
Forensic and Valuation Services Executive 
Committee. In 2004 she completed a three 
year term as chair of the AICPA Forensic 
& Litigation Services Committee, which 
has oversight for a number of task forces 
including fraud.
4 See Kevin LaCroix’s blog, D&O Diary, at www.dandodiary.com, for insights on these cases. His online journal can be very informative for those interested in directors’ 
and officers’ liability.
How To Become Certified In Financial Forensics
For information about how to attain the Certified in Financial Forensics (CFF) credential mentioned by Sandra Johni­
gan in the preceding article, go to http://fvs.aicpa.org.
Click the “Become a CFF” tab in the box on the left for an overview of the credential, the eligibility requirements, 
and the application process.
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HEDGE FUNDS: RED FLAGS, LITIGATION, AND THE ROLE OF 
THE FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING EXPERT
B y  E l i z a  C u m b e r l a n d ,  C F A ,  M B A , a n d  A g n e s  S c h w i e t e r t ,  C P A , M B A
Assets under the m anagem ent of 
hedge funds declined nearly 40% 
in 2008 because of trading losses 
and falling asset values, redem p­
tions, liquidations, and deleverag­
ing.1 The ebbing tide of funding 
revealed the fraud perpetrated by 
Bernard Madoff, among others, and 
added to the growing num ber of 
cases filed against hedge fund third 
parties, such as fund administrators 
and fund of funds (FOF) managers, 
alleging that they were negligent in 
performing their duties and ignored 
warning signs of fraud.
This article explores some of the 
warning signs or “red flags” that can 
suggest fund managers are violating 
their duties, and to which hedge 
fund third parties have visibility, as 
well as why, at the time, these indi­
cators may not be seen as conclu­
sive or even suggestive. It will also 
discuss the role of forensic accoun­
tants and financial experts in evalu­
ating the quality of due diligence, 
monitoring, and assurance proce­
dures performed by third parties in 
tracing redemptions and subscrip­
tions, as well as investigating invest­
ments valuations and calculating 
damages to the failed funds and 
their investors.
Prior to 2008, hedge funds had 
tremendous overall growth in assets 
under management as more inves­
tors, especially institutional investors, 
sought the diversification benefits 
of this alternative asset class. These 
investors’ demands for transparency, 
independent valuation, and opera­
tional risk management, as well as 
the administrative needs of growing 
assets under management, led to the 
expanded use of outside adminis­
trators. Most recently, institutional
investors have begun to restrict 
investments to only those hedge 
funds that use an adm inistrator 
because of the added assurance inde­
pendent administration provides.
In addition to performing other 
back office and middle office func­
tions, hedge fund administrators 
oversee investor reporting , p ro ­
cess subscrip tion  and red em p ­
tion requests, independently price 
assets, calculate Net Asset Value 
(NAV) and  perfo rm an ce  fees, 
maintain accounting records, and 
prepare funds’ financial statements. 
By independently performing these 
functions for the funds, administra­
tors have more visibility to warning 
signs, such as valuation adjustments 
or trading schemes that suggest a 
fund m anager is inappropriately 
manipulating or inflating asset val­
ues. However, not all adjustments 
are inappropriate, and patterns of 
manipulative trading may be dif­
ficult to detect. Hedge funds often 
invest in assets that are complex or 
illiquid. In such cases, hedge fund 
managers may calculate or adjust 
market asset prices to appropriately 
reflect NAV for redem ptions and 
subscriptions, as prescribed by the 
offering documents (for example, 
private placement memoranda and 
prospectuses). O ther often cited 
red flags include persistent posi­
tive returns and large concentra­
tions of asset holdings, but positive 
returns and investment concentra­
tion do not necessarily signal fraud, 
especially because external pric­
ing sources are generally used by 
administrators to calculate asset val­
ues, and offering documents gener­
ally do not prevent large exposure 
to individual assets.
N onetheless, investors com ­
monly rely on third parties, such as 
administrators, to ensure that fund 
managers comply with the valua­
tion methodology cited in offering 
documents for any adjustments to 
asset value and that the inputs used 
and adjustments made in the calcu­
lation are reasonable. Administra­
tors are responsible for ensuring 
that their procedures for calculat­
ing or verifying asset values are 
sufficient to uncover impropriety, 
and they cannot ignore other warn­
ing signs, such as poor supporting 
data and documentation or delays 
in receiving inform ation. Having 
improper or insufficient procedures 
or ignoring warning signs can leave 
an administrator vulnerable to liti­
gation. In such cases, the role of 
the financial and accounting expert 
may be to review the adm inistra­
tor’s compliance with the valuation 
methodology set forth in offering 
documents and administrative ser­
vices agreements, revalue the port­
folio assets for the period under 
investigation, identify adjustments 
tha t should have been applied  
(for example, liquidity discounts), 
recalculate the NAV, reconcile the 
appropriate valuation for redemp­
tions and subscriptions to actual 
cash flows to and from investors, 
and identify any preferential or 
inappropriate payments.
Investors rely on auditors to inde­
pendently verify information in a 
fund’s financial statements, a process 
that encompasses investigation of 
poor internal controls and identi­
fication of insufficient documenta­
tion, unsupported adjustments to 
third party valuations, or unusual 
fee structures. This also includes
1 Walker, David, “Hedge-fund redemptions were $382 billion in 2008.” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123257834410704063. 
html?mod=djkeyword.
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independent verification of the exis­
tence of fund assets held by custo­
dians or prime brokers. Auditors 
have faced litigation when manager 
impropriety was not revealed in the 
audit. In such cases, the role of the 
financial and accounting expert is to 
review the auditor’s compliance with 
Generally Accepted Auditing Stan­
dards and to calculate the impact of 
audit failures on the damages sus­
tained by the fund or investors.
A llegations have also been  
brought against prime brokers and 
custodians in the wake of hedge 
fund failures. Prime brokers provide 
securities clearing for hedge funds, 
as well as o ther services, such as 
leverage financing, securities lend­
ing, operational support, and risk 
management advisory services. Cus­
todians are responsible for safekeep­
ing assets, arranging for settlement 
of purchases and sales of securities, 
collecting information about and 
income from such assets (for exam­
ple, dividends and interest), manag­
ing cash transactions, performing 
foreign exchange transactions, and 
providing regular reporting to their 
clients. As such, prime brokers and 
custodians are uniquely positioned 
to observe such warning high-vol­
ume trading at m onth or quarter 
end, which may suggest an attempt 
by the hedge fund to manipulate 
asset values. Furthermore, because 
prime brokers and custodians moni­
tor the risk profile of their hedge 
fund clients and are aware of the 
assets in which these hedge funds 
are invested, they have visibility to 
their clients’ asset concentration 
and liquidity. However, brokers and 
custodians are hired by hedge funds 
to perform specific functions, which 
generally do not include oversight. 
Furthermore, hedge funds may use 
more than one broker in executing 
trades to which other brokers do 
not have visibility.
Many investors looking for the 
return and diversification benefits 
of investing in hedge funds but with 
added assurance have turned  to
FOFs. In exchange for an additional 
layer of asset- and perform ance- 
based fees, investors have relied on 
the due diligence and monitoring 
efforts of FOF managers to protect 
them from fraud style drift, and 
deviations from offering document 
guidelines, as well as to provide 
diversification and exposure to cer­
tain funds. As sophisticated inves­
tors, FOF managers have extensive 
industry knowledge, an understand­
ing of complex investments and 
investment strategies, and experi­
ence in performing due diligence. 
Reputable FOF managers source 
investments in hedge funds based 
on performance and strategy fit, as 
well as the fund manager’s reputa­
tion, experience, past performance, 
and references. They perform back­
ground checks (including credit, 
credentials, and corporate and court 
records), conduct on-site interviews, 
and review the hedge fund’s opera­
tions. In addition to the screening 
process, a FOF m anager usually 
tracks relevant news, performance, 
and financial information for each 
of the hedge funds in the portfolio.
A lack of timely information or 
actions that prevent the due dili­
gence and monitoring process (such 
as efforts to thwart subsequent onsite 
visits) are seen as warning signs of 
impropriety. A wave of departures 
or a drop in minimum investment 
requirem ents may also be indica­
tors of issues at a fund. However, 
FOF managers actively follow market 
news and trends that will affect their 
investments and, therefore, may view 
these actions to be legitimate reac­
tions to market developments rather 
than attempts to defraud investors. 
Delays in investment allocation or 
performance reporting by a hedge 
fund may be seen as the result of 
recent illiquidity in the market or 
difficulty in pricing an asset, or both. 
A drop in minimum investment 
requirements might be interpreted 
as the hedge fund’s attempt to raise 
capital following large redemptions 
in a recessionary climate.
Nonetheless, FOF managers do 
have exposure to litigation related 
to hedge fund losses when they fail 
to perform sufficient due diligence 
or when warning signs are misinter­
preted. In such cases, the role of the 
financial and accounting expert is to 
assess the extent to which the FOF 
manager was negligent in his or her 
due diligence, monitoring and track­
ing, and market analysis, as well as to 
present an overview of the market 
conditions and information that the 
FOF manager would have reason­
ably relied upon in reaching his or 
her conclusions. In the context of 
litigation, financial experts will also 
calculate the impact, if any, of fail­
ures in the due diligence process on 
the damages sustained by the fund 
or investors.
In cases where a hedge fund is 
revealed to be nothing more than 
a Ponzi scheme, damaged parties 
generally seek the return of ficti­
tious profits realized by redeeming 
investors and performance income 
earned by fund managers (includ­
ing FOF managers) on fictitious 
returns. A key responsibility of the 
financial and accounting expert is 
tracing the flow of funds and eval­
uating the redem ptions and sub­
scriptions of each investor. This 
includes calculating the principal 
and realized profit components of 
each redemption based on the offer­
ing documents and any governing 
side letters, as well as calculating the 
management fees and performance 
compensation made to fund (and 
FOF) managers based on fictitious 
returns.
A number of recent hedge fund 
failures can be attributed to fraud 
and misrepresentation. In many of 
these cases, the services of hedge 
fund third parties came under scru­
tiny. Although coming years will 
see more regulation in the industry 
and a clarification of duties owed 
by these third parties, the flexibility 
and complexity of hedge fund invest­
ments and the myriad ways that 
fraud can be perpetrated renders
4
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the risk of litigation a continued 
threat. For this reason, a critical eye 
to warning signs and red flags will 
continue to be important, as will the 
role of the forensic accountant and 
financial expert in evaluating the 
adequacy of monitoring performed
and in calculating damages when 
such failures occur.
Source: Huron Consulting Group 
Inc. © 2009
All Rights Reserved. X
Eliza G. Cumberland, CFA, MBA, is a direc­
tor and Agnes Schwietert, CPA, MBA, is a 
manager with the Huron Consulting Group, 
Chicago, IL. For more information: www. 
huronconsultinggroup.com.
CONSIDERING A METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING 
POTENTIAL SECTION 1 Ob-5 DAMAGES
B y  D o u g la s  E .  F a r r o w ,  C P A / C F F
Over the past decade, media head­
lines have been filled with topics sur­
rounding corporate scandals and eco­
nomic turmoil. These events depict an 
escalating corporate culture in which 
executives consistently choose per­
sonal gain over ethical business deci­
sions and are constantly challenged to 
meet the frequently changing needs 
of their shareholders. This corporate 
environment promoted the practice 
of intentionally altering financial state­
ments in order to portray the results 
of operations more favorably than 
they otherwise would be—in other 
words, financial reporting fraud.
Financial reporting fraud threatens 
the investing public’s confidence in 
the securities markets and the finan­
cial reporting system because investors 
who buy and sell stock rely on the 
integrity of market prices. Because of 
this reliance, dissemination of mis­
leading or fraudulent information can 
affect securities’ prices. In 1942, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 to prohibit 
fraudulent conduct—that is, material 
misrepresentations or nondisclosures 
by issuers—associated with the sale 
and purchase of securities.1
The ru le ’s in ten t is to protect 
investors to the extent that if liability 
for making misleading statements or 
omissions that affect the securities 
markets is established, they can make 
a 10b-5 claim. Once they make a
claim, the issue of damages becomes 
relevant.
Very little case law is available on 
the assessment of 10b-5 damages, 
given the proclivity of parties to set­
tle these cases before trial. Although 
experts use a variety of methods to 
calculate 10b-5 damages, the most 
widely accepted method is the “out- 
of-pocket” methodology described by 
Judge Sneed in his 1976 opinion in 
Green v. Occidental Petroleum.2
According to Judge Sneed’s meth­
odology, investors are divided into the 
following two classifications depend­
ing on the type of damages they incur:
In-and-out investors who pur­
chased and sold shares during the 
class period.1 23 Out-of-pocket dam­
ages for in-and-out investors are 
known as trading damages, which 
are the difference between the 
inflation at the time of purchase 
and inflation at the time of sale. 
Inflation is the difference between 
the actual price of the stock and 
its true value (estimated value of 
stock absent the fraud).
2. Retention investors who purchased 
shares during the class period 
and retained them after the class 
period ended. Out-of-pocket damages 
for retention investors (retention 
damages) are the amount of infla­
tion at the time of purchase.
Total estimated damages are the sum
of all retention damages and all trading
damages for the shares affected over a 
specified class period. Consequently, 
the damages calculation requires the 
following three computations:
• Estimating the class period
• Measuring inflation per share of 
the security
• Determining the number of shares 
affected during the class period
ESTIMATING THE CLASS PERIOD
Estimating the class period can be 
a subjective process; however, the 
period generally starts on the date 
of the misrepresentation or nondis­
closure and ends on the date of final 
curative disclosure.
Com plications arise, however, 
when these dates are not clearly 
defined. For example, if the class 
period is based on a failure to dis­
close, it may be difficult to determine 
when the company learned of the 
material information. Alternatively, if 
the class period is based on mislead­
ing or incomplete information, the 
true information often trickles into 
the marketplace through a series of 
announcements, thus making an end 
date difficult to establish.
MEASURING 'INFLATION' PER SHARE
In 10b-5 damages cases, the differ­
ence between the actual price of the 
stock and the true value is known as 
inflation. Actual price reflects the his­
torical market price of a company
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
2 541 F.2d 1335,1341 (9th Cir. 1976)
3 This article assumes the court will accept the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy the reliance element of section 10b-5 and the defendant(s) will be unable to rebut the 
presumption of reliance (that is, that the misrepresentation did not lead to a distortion of the stock price).
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stock. Determining the true value, 
however, is a more theoretical exer­
cise. In theory, the true value of a 
stock could be derived from its 
expected return.
A common concept in the analy­
sis of the value of a stock is return, 
which is the reward of bearing the 
risk of investing in a stock. Speci­
fically, actual return on a particular 
stock investment is the percentage 
change in the actual stock price over 
the previous trading day and expected 
return is the percentage change in 
the true value of a company’s stock 
over the previous trading day. Abnor­
mal returns refers to the difference 
between actual returns and expected 
returns.
To estimate expected return, the 
analyst can use any of several widely 
accepted financial models, including 
event study, comparable index, and 
regression analysis.
Event study
An event study approach treats disclo­
sures of fraud-related information 
as events and substitutes expected 
returns on event days. This approach 
assumes that price and value of a 
security move in tandem, except on 
days when fraud-related information 
is disclosed.
Expected returns on event days 
are estimated through an analysis of 
changes in stock price, as well as the 
market return or industry return, or 
both.
The problem with this approach 
is the bias created when information 
leaks to the market prior to the offi­
cial public announcement (that is, 
the event day), which could lead to 
understated damages.
A possible solution to this problem 
is to modify the event study approach 
to include analysis of the event over 
a “window” to assess more accurately 
the effect of the information. Addi­
tionally, the practitioner can consider 
the intraday price fluctuations on
event days to determine if those price 
changes are significant from a statisti­
cal perspective.
Comparable index
An alternative method to measure 
inflation per share is a comparable 
index approach. This method uses 
available company, m arket, and 
industry data to estimate the true 
value of the stock from the end to 
the beginning of the class period. 
Two indexes commonly used in the 
comparable index approach are the 
com parable company index and 
the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 
index.4
The calculation of the compara­
ble company index is based on an 
average of the actual returns for a 
group of companies that are compa­
rable in industry, size, growth, and 
market capitalization.
The comparable index approach 
assumes that, absent the fraud, the 
company’s value pattern over the 
class period would be similar to 
those of its comparable companies. 
In addition, this m ethod holds all 
other issues constant and considers 
fraud the only difference between 
a company engaged in fraud and 
its comparable companies.5 Thus, 
unless there are other concurrent 
company specific events, the differ­
ence in return is attributable to the 
existence of fraud.
By selecting firms for the compa­
rable index that are similar in size and 
in book-to-market-value ratios, non- 
market risk is controlled. However, 
doubts may arise about whether the 
comparable index method adequately 
controls for market risk. Regression 
models are the best way to control for 
market risk.
Regression analysis
Regression analysis makes predic­
tions of expected return based on the 
historical relationship between the 
stock price and certain independent
variables, such as market return, 
industry return, the excess of mar­
ket return over the risk-free rate of 
return, the difference in returns for 
an index of small stocks versus large, 
and the difference in returns for high 
value versus high growth opportu­
nity stocks. Like all statistical mod­
els, regression analysis produces esti­
mates with a degree of uncertainty, 
measured by the standard errors that 
accompany any forecast.
The most frequently used regres­
sion analyses are the capital asset pric­
ing model (CAPM), market model, 
three-factor model, and a variation 
of these models. Each model has its 
strengths and weaknesses.
CAPM
The CAPM, representing a single- 
period market, is built on the prem­
ise that investors should be compen­
sated for the time value of money 
and the risk taken. It makes assump­
tions that capital markets are com­
petitive with no frictions, informa­
tion is cost free, and investors can 
borrow and lend at the risk-free (rF) 
rate. Expected return (rE) under 
the CAPM is equal to: rE = rF + 
βmarket(rM - rF)
The time value of money is repre­
sented by the risk-free rate and com­
pensates investors for placing money 
in any investment over a period of 
time. The other half of the formula 
represents risk and calculates the 
amount of compensation the inves­
tor needs for taking on the addi­
tional risk of investing in a company. 
This is calculated by multiplying the 
risk measure (β), which compares 
the returns of a company’s stock to 
the market return over a period of 
time, by the market premium (rM -  
rF), which is the difference between 
the expected market rate of return 
and the risk-free rate of return.
The key factor in the CAPM equa­
tion is the excess of the market return 
over the risk-free rate. Market return
4 This model is sometimes referred to as the Matching Sample Model.
5 It has also been suggested that the comparable index and event study can be used in conjunction with one another. That is, if the comparable index is used to account 
for market information and the event study is used to identify firm-specific events, the effects of the litigation-related events can be assessed more accurately.
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is estimated by the return on a broad 
index of stocks, such as the S&P 500 
Index. The risk-free rate of return is 
typically equal to the daily yield on the 
three-month Treasury bill.
The CAPM is a well accepted 
model familiar to stock analysts and 
relies on readily available data. The 
CAPM model also is widely used 
by valuation analysts in estimating 
the cost of equity capital for firms. 
Although based on well developed 
theory, this model does not account 
for all sources of risk, which may 
lead to an overestimate of abnormal 
returns. In addition, long run abnor­
mal returns may be skewed.6
Market model
The market model assumes that a 
company’s expected return is deter­
mined solely by the market return. 
Under this theory, the daily change 
in value of an index of publicly 
traded stocks, such as the S&P 500 
index, defines market return.
E xpected  re tu rn  u n d e r  the 
market model is equal to: rE = α + 
βmarket (rM)
In this equation, β measures the 
sensitivity of a company’s stock return 
to the market return over a period of 
time, and α represents an intercept 
term, which means that if the market 
return equals zero, the return to a 
company would be alpha, a constant.
The widely used market model is a 
simple method to estimate expected 
returns. However, like the CAPM, the 
market model may not account for 
all changes in the stock price and 
may not be as accurate for unique 
event situations. In addition, long-run 
returns may be skewed.
Three-factor model
The three-factor model expands on 
the CAPM by adding size and value 
factors to the model. That is, this 
model considers the fact that value
and small cap stocks outperform  
markets on a regular basis.
Expected return under the three- 
factor model is equal to:
rE = r f  + Pm arket(rM -rf) + 
βsize(SMB) + βvalue (HML)7
The CAPM discussion explains 
the front end of this equation. In 
the back half of the equation, βsize 
(small cap minus big or SMB) rep­
resents the premium for investing in 
small cap stock over large cap stocks 
and βvalue (high book/price minus 
low or HML) represents the risk pre­
mium for investing in high value over 
high growth opportunity stocks). The 
size beta is the sensitivity of a compa­
ny’s stock return to the size factor, 
and the value beta is the sensitivity of 
a company’s stock return to the book 
value to market value ratio.8
Although the three-factor model 
adds more factors to the CAPM to 
explain abnormal returns, the extra 
factors employed might not actu­
ally improve the m odel’s explana­
tory power. In addition, like the 
CAPM, the three-factor model may 
not prove effective when applied to a 
unique event.
A common variation of these three 
models is to add another factor based 
on industry returns, calculated as an 
average of a sample of comparable 
firms (as in the comparable index 
method discussed previously).
DETERMINING DAMAGED SHARES
Estimates of aggregate damages due 
to securities fraud depend upon 
the loss per share to affected share­
holders and the num ber of shares 
affected. The latter depends on the 
pattern  of trade during the class 
period and the analyst cannot deter­
mine it simply by using the number 
of shares outstanding at the event 
date. The reason is some of these 
shares may have been purchased 
before the start of the class period
or may be ineligible for damages for 
other reasons.
In large shareholder class action 
cases, because the trading records of 
most shareholders are unavailable, 
trading models must be used to esti­
mate how many shares are affected, 
and over what period of time. The 
trading models typically use volume, 
float, and turnover data to estimate 
how many shares were purchased and 
sold each day and how many of the 
purchased shares were held until the 
event date instead of being sold dur­
ing the class period.9 Trading models 
may be controversial because limited 
empirical research exists to support 
them. Given the extremely hypotheti­
cal nature of these models, the sim­
plest model should be employed.
The two basic forms of trading 
models used for calculation are the 
single trader model (STM) and the 
multiple trader model (MTM).
Single trader model
STM assumes one class of inves­
tors because the trading behavior 
of each member is identical (that 
is, all have the same tu rnover 
rate, trading frequency, and hold­
ing period). In the extrem e, the 
STM assumes that all shares were 
traded by a single investor. Such an 
assumption makes for a relatively 
simple trading model and usually 
results in lower damages estimates.
Types of STMs include the follow­
ing:
• Proportional trading m odel
(PTM). Assumes all shares are 
equally likely to be traded during 
a given period. In other words, 
each previous day contributes to 
the current volume in the same 
proportion. The PTM requires 
little information about individual 
shareholders’ trading behavior 
and is often referred to as the “no 
inform ation m odel.” Although
6 For additional discussion on the shortcomings of the capital asset pricing model, see pages 25-46 of the article, “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evi­
dence,” by Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 3.
7 See footnote 6.
8 The book value to market value ratio is often used as a proxy to determine growth opportunities.
9 The float is defined as the number of shares outstanding and available to the public for trading, excluding the shares held by insiders.
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the PTM is a popular model, it 
possesses certain drawbacks—the 
trading volume does not take 
into account intermediate trad­
ing and an unmodified PTM does 
not account for different trading 
patterns of different investors. 
Because all trading models are 
hypothetical, the main virtue of 
the PTM is its simplicity.
Adjusted PTM. Makes modifica­
tions to the PTM to account for its 
shortcomings. More specifically, 
the volume is adjusted to account 
for intermediate trading and short 
sales so that only trades between 
final customers are considered.10 
Additionally, the adjusted PTM 
allows for subgroups of investors 
with different holding periods 
rather than lumping investors into 
a homogenous group.
Inventory-based trading model. 
Uses inventory accounting con­
ventions to describe trad ing  
behavior. For example, the first- 
in-first-out (FIFO) model assumes 
that shares sold on a given day 
are sold by those who held them 
longest. Such a model produces 
higher retention damages and 
lower trading damages compared 
with PTM. Conversely, the last-in- 
first-out (LIFO) model assumes 
that the most recent buyers sell 
first. Both retention and trading 
damages are lower under LIFO 
PTM. However, no evidence shows 
that investor behavior is consistent 
with either LIFO or FIFO, and
some believe the LIFO assump­
tions may be somewhat irrational.
• A ccelerated trading m odel. 
Relaxes the assumption that each 
share is equally likely to be traded 
and allows for the likelihood of 
different shares being traded dif­
ferently, but in a particular way— 
accelerated, for instance. This 
model is perhaps more realistic 
than other models, but typically 
requires more information about 
shareholder trading activity, which 
may prove difficult to gather.
• General trading m odel. Pro­
vides more flexibility in trading 
behavior because it allows for the 
likelihood of a trade to decline 
gradually as the holding period 
increases. This means that more 
recently purchased shares are 
more likely to trade again com­
pared with shares held for a lon­
ger period of time. Although this 
assumption seems realistic, the 
model and its algorithms are not 
as well developed and tested. In 
addition, the model is more com­
plicated than others described 
in this article and requires more 
input data and validation data.
Multiple trading model
The MTM assumes multiple groups 
of investors with d ifferen t trad ­
ing behaviors. The simplest MTM 
assumes two classes of traders: short­
term traders with high frequency, 
high volume, and low holdings; and 
long-term traders with low volume,
low frequency, and high holdings. A 
more complex MTM could include 
many classes of traders in between 
these two classes. In the extreme 
form of the MTM, each share is con­
sidered traded by a different investor.
CONSIDERING THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES
Although very little case law exists 
on the assessment of 10b-5 dam­
ages, Judge Sneed’s “out-of-pocket” 
methodology of computing 10b-5 
damages is arguably the most cited 
authority. Such calculation requires 
the m easurem ent of inflation per 
share, which is the difference between 
the actual price and the true value 
of the stock. Practitioners can use a 
number of methodologies to deter­
mine a stock’s true value, including 
event study, comparable index, and 
regression analysis. Given the rela­
tive strengths and limitations of the 
methods used to estimate a stock’s 
true value, experts should adopt a 
measure of damages based on the 
types of data available and on the 
specific facts and circumstances of 
the case presented. X
Douglas E. Farrow, CPA/CFF, is a partner 
in the forensic practice at audit, tax, and 
advisory firm KPMG LLP. He is based in Los 
Angeles. This article represents the views 
of the author only and does not necessarily 
represent the views or professional advice 
of KPMG LLP. The information contained 
herein is of a general nature and is not 
intended to address the specific circum­
stances of any individual or entity. Farrow 
can be contacted via email at dfarrow@ 
kpmg.com and 213-955-8389.
10 In a short sale, an investor sells shares “borrowed” from another investor speculating that the stock is overvalued. This in effect increases the float, yet no shares have 
actually traded hands until the short seller buys back the shares to cover his position
DISCOUNT RATES AND LOST PROFITS... 
WHERE'S THE RISK?
B y  C r a ig  M . E n o s ,  C P A / A B V / C F F ,  a n d  G r e g  R e g a n ,  C P A / C F F
Consider the following two scenarios:
1. A property owner enters into a 
10-year lease agreement, but prior 
to the lessee occupying the space, 
the market crashes. Consequently,
the lessee breaches the agree­
ment in favor of a more economi­
cal arrangement.
2. A start-up company enters into its 
first major licensing arrangement
with an autom obile m anufac­
turer. However, soon thereafter, 
the autom obile m anufacturer 
te rm ina tes  the  a rra n g em en t 
before making any of the sched­
uled payments.
If you’re in the shoes of the 
non-breaching party in these cir­
cum stances or a host of o ther 
potential scenarios, you’ve possibly 
sustained lost profits. However, expec­
tations of lost profits often contain
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uncertainties, including the prob­
ability that they may not arise until 
future periods. As a result, a CPA 
engaged to compute those lost prof­
its will need to consider an appropri­
ate discount rate to bring those dam­
ages amounts to present value. This 
article focuses on the development 
of a discount rate and how it relates 
to the calculation of lost profits.1
OBJECTIVES OF A LOST PROFITS 
CALCULATION
When undertaking a lost profits cal­
culation, the CPA should discount 
future profits at a rate that fairly 
compensates the plaintiff. Because 
the goal is to make the plaintiff 
whole, the plaintiff should receive an 
amount at the date of judgment that 
can be invested over the period of 
future loss and yield the plaintiff the 
amount of lost profits.
What does this objective necessi­
tate? One common method to com­
pute damages is the three column 
approach. This analysis compares the 
actual scenario with the “but-for” sce­
nario and the difference is the dam­
ages quantification of the damages. 
If any portion of the damages occurs 
in the future, a discount rate, at a 
minimum, should be applied to take 
into consideration the time value of 
money. However, the bigger chal­
lenge for the CPA expert is to address 
the risk that the damages could have 
been realized in the “but-for” sce­
nario and determine whether this 
risk is reflected in the discount rate 
selected. Accordingly, the CPA expert 
must consider whether or not:2
• the damages analysis incorporates 
sufficiently conservative assump­
tions. If so, the discount rate 
should reflect only the time value 
of money;
• the damages model leaves a resid­
ual amount of risk that should be 
addressed via a relatively higher 
discount rate; or
• the model should be left unad­
justed with all risk considerations 
included in the discount rate.
All th ree  of the approaches
involve applying a reality check to 
the plaintiff’s “hoped for” income 
stream. In o ther words, the CPA 
expert should analyze the achiev­
ability of the plaintiff’s projections 
and challenge any speculative com­
ponents or assumptions. Once the 
“hoped for” income stream has been 
adjusted, the expert will apply a dis­
count rate consistent with the level of 
risk determined to be remaining in 
the projected cash flows.
The advantage of reducing risk 
in the damages m odel is trans­
parency. Supporters argue that, 
whereas the CPA expert u n d er­
stands the resulting volatility that 
alternative discount rates may stimu­
late, a judge or jury is less likely to 
be in the same position. Support­
ers of the third theory argue that 
the correct m ethod is to project 
the “hoped for” income stream and 
then account for risk by applying 
a risk adjusted discount rate. This 
m ethod may be more frequently 
associa ted  with business valu­
ation purposes, where an entity’s 
weighted average cost of capital or 
its cost of equity may be applied.
Ultimately, the appropriateness 
of a discount rate will depend on 
the theory that the user subscribes 
to, and it may vary given the par­
ticular circumstances of a matter. In 
practice, the low end of the range 
of discount rates may reflect the rate 
of return on a Treasury bond, which 
may be applied to a secure income 
stream in a breach of contract case 
with a counterparty of high credit 
standing. On the other end of the 
rate spectrum , an equity rate of 
return may be appropriate for an 
income stream that has greater risk, 
such as the projected future income 
of a new business.
GUIDANCE FROM THE COURTS
Available case law provides evi­
dence that courts will accept a 
broad range of applied discounts. 
For example, in Schonfeld v. Hill­
iard, 62 F.Supp 2d 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999), which involved a loss of 
$100,000 per year for a 10-year con­
tract, the court accepted an 8% dis­
count rate, the rate of the 10-year 
U.S. Treasury bond. Thus, the cash 
flow stream was assumed to be vir­
tually risk free, and the discount 
rate reflected only the time value 
of money. In contrast, in another 
breach of contract case, Fairmont 
Supply Company v. Hooks Industrial, 
Inc., No. 01-03-01129-CV (Tex. App. 
1 Dist [Houston] 2005), the court 
accepted the range of 33% pre­
sented by the defendant’s expert, 
and 36% presented by the plain­
tiff’s expert. Assuming that in each 
case the same $100,000 10-year cash 
flow stream received at year end was 
at stake, the first court would have 
awarded approximately $671,000 
(using an 8% discount rate), whereas 
the second court would have only 
awarded approximately $285,000 
(using a 33% discount rate)—a sig­
nificant difference to say the least.
A consequence of these two com­
peting methods is that comparability 
between the two approaches is inher­
ently complex. Using the discount 
rates accepted in each case would 
necessitate reducing the cash flow 
stream in the first case to approxi­
mately $42,500 to achieve results 
comparable to those in the second 
case. In other words, a 10-year cash 
flow loss of $42,500 per year dis­
counted to present value at a con­
stant rate of 8% would yield the same 
damages of approximately $285,000. 
Accordingly, a worthwhile consider­
ation is whether a jury would under­
stand that the application of a dis­
count rate in the mid-30s (instead of 
8%) essentially produces the same
1 For a more detailed description of the elements of a lost profits analysis, the reader is encouraged to study other texts that have been written on the subject (for exam­
ple, AICPA Practice Aid No. 06-4, Calculating Lost Profits). For information about obtaining this publication, go online to www.cpa2biz.com or call 888-777-7077.
2 These approaches are more extensively summarized in “Modeling and Discounting Future Damages,” by Robert Dunn and Everett Harry, Journal of Accountancy, January 
2002.
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result as reducing the annual cash 
flows well in excess of 50%.
Interest rates fluctuate over time 
relative to broader economic condi­
tions. As a result, a practitioner may 
apply different absolute discount 
rates even in similar circumstances. 
For example, if the 10-year U.S. Trea­
sury rate of return were employed as 
a discount rate in March 2009, the 
discount rate applied would have 
been only 2.8% and consequently 
the award would have been approxi­
mately $862,000.
The appropriateness of a discount 
rate is rarely talked about in court 
decisions. When it is, the discussion 
usually involves little more than identi­
fying the rate that the court accepted. 
In the following pages, we explore 
a few cases in which discount rates 
came under discussion. The cases 
are representative of the available 
decisions directly addressing the dis­
count rates selected by the testifying 
experts. Although no legal precedent 
has been established to define the 
appropriateness of specific discount 
rates given certain circumstances, the 
important lesson we observe is the 
reliance the courts place on the cred­
ible judgments of experts.
ENERGY CAPITAL V. UNITED STATES
In Energy Capital v. United States, 
302 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 
Energy sought to recover dam ­
ages for breach of contract. Energy 
had negotiated an agreement, the 
Affordable Housing Energy Loan 
Program (AHELP), with the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) to eliminate 
regulatory barriers to financing 
energy improvements in HUD prop­
erties. HUD promised to provide 
security for AHELP loans. However, 
HUD terminated the AHELP agree­
m ent approximately five m onths 
after it had been signed. In those 
five months, Energy had not com­
pleted the process of originating any 
loans, but the AHELP agreement 
did not have a termination for con­
venience clause.
Energy’s expert calculated dam­
ages using a discounted cash flow 
approach. The expert employed a 
10.5% discount rate based upon the 
average dividend yield for mortgage 
real estate investments trusts (REITs) 
of 8.5% plus 2% to account for the 
debt and profit components of the 
AHELP arrangement. The expert 
asserted this rate as a proxy because 
a mortgage REIT was a potential 
market participant for AHELP loans. 
The court concurred. The buildup 
of this discount rate, in this fashion, 
cited specific and reliable informa­
tion, which increased the justifica­
tion for its usage.
The court rejected the discount 
rate of 25% offered by the govern­
m ent’s expert. Although the court 
did not specify the opposing expert’s 
basis for opining on the appropri­
ateness of this rate, the rate would 
appear to be the p roduct of a 
weighted average cost of capital for 
Energy, or another similar compu­
tation. In this instance, the court’s 
acceptance of the lower discount rate 
because the damages arose from a 
breach of the contract by the govern­
ment appears to be a typical arrange­
ment of lower risk. In addition, when 
determining the discrete cash flow 
loss of the AHELP agreement, Ener­
gy’s damages should not be burdened 
by a discount rate potentially reflec­
tive of the aggregate cost of capital 
associated with its business. Thus, the 
term and risk of the arrangement are 
more consistent with the factors con­
sidered by Energy’s expert.
BURGER KING CORP. V. BARNES
In Burger King Corp. v. Barnes, 1 F. 
Supp.2d 1367 (S.D. Fla 1998), the 
dispute concerned the breach of a 
franchise agreement entered into 
between Burger King Corporation, 
as franchisor, and Zuri Barnes, as 
franchisee. The court found that 
Barnes’ abandonment of the fran­
chise agreement constituted a mate­
rial breach of contract.
B arnes had  ag re e d  to pay 
Burger King a royalty of 3.5% of
monthly gross sales. At the time of 
the breach, 17.5 years remained in 
the 20-year franchise agreement. 
The projected lost royalty income 
to Burger King for the remaining 
term of the agreement was reduced 
to present value at a discount rate 
of 9%.
The court did not provide a ratio­
nale for selecting this rate. However, 
at that time, average yields on U.S. 
Treasury securities with 10- to 30-year 
maturities were in the 5% range and 
the prime rate was generally 8.5%. 
Therefore, the court appears to 
have acknowledged that, despite the 
time remaining in the agreement, 
the Burger King franchise warranted 
a level of risk approximately com­
mensurate with the prime rate at 
the time, a standard lending rate by 
banks to creditworthy customers.
OLSON V. NEIMAN
In Olson v. Nieman, 579 N.W.2d 299 
(Iowa 1998), Olson alleged mis­
appropriation of his ideas by Nie­
man. Olson had developed an idea 
for breakaway hazard lights, which 
would activate flashing lights on 
a trailer if it disengaged from the 
transporting vehicle.
The plaintiff’s expert developed 
four models to calculate damages, 
using a reasonable royalty measure 
of damages and a market approach. 
The expert presented, and the court 
accepted, a discount rate of 19.4%. 
He testified that the normal rate of 
return  for publicly held corpora­
tions was 14.4%. He added an addi­
tional 5% to reflect the market risk 
of the device.
In this case, the opinion provided 
specific insight into the construc­
tion of the applied discount rate. 
Specifically, the construction of 
the accepted discount rate resem­
bles a cost of equity analysis, using 
a buildup method adjusted for the 
risks associated with a relevant prod­
uct market (see paragraph 114 of 
AICPA Practice Aid 06-4, Calculating 
Lost Profits for a discussion of this 
methodology). Compared with the
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Burger King case, this higher dis­
count rate was likely appropriate to 
address the greater degree of risk 
associated with a development stage 
company as opposed to a franchi­
see of an entity with a historical 
track record (note that both awards 
occurred in 1998, thereby facilitating 
comparability of applicable market 
rates of interest).
OTHER DISCOUNT RATE GUIDANCE
The Office of M anagem ent and 
Budget (OMB) provides another 
perspective on discount rates. Since 
1992, OMB Circular No. A-94, “Dis­
count Rates for Cost Effectiveness 
Analysis of Federal Programs,” has 
required an estimation of the eco­
nomic cost of all proposed govern­
ment regulations to be discounted 
at a rate of 7% because “that rate 
approxim ates the m arginal p re­
tax rate of return  on an average 
investment in the private sector in 
recent years.” The OMB adopted 
this definitional rate in part to pro­
m ote com parability am ong pro­
posed regulations; this rate may not 
be appropriate in o ther circum ­
stances. The OMB also requires all 
submitted proposals to use other 
discount rates for purposes of illus­
trating sensitivities. CPAs can appre­
ciate this requirem ent because of 
the implications for damages calcu­
lations caused by the discount rate 
as described herein.
OTHER ISSUES CPAS CONFRONT IN 
DEFINING DISCOUNT RATES
Discount rates are also affected by 
the expert’s decision to employ 
an ex-post or ex-ante approach to 
computing damages. As described 
in paragraphs 106-109 of AICPA 
Practice Aid 06-4, this selection 
entails the expert’s decision whether 
to factor events subsequent to the 
purported damages date into the 
computation. If the expert adopts 
an ex-ante approach, then all profits 
are future profits and the damages 
amounts are discounted to pres­
ent value as of the damages date.
However, if the expert adopts an ex­
post approach, then he or she consid­
ers information available between 
the damages date and the time of 
the preparation of the damages com­
putation, and only damages after the 
date of judgment are discounted to 
present value.
In a situation in which one ex­
pert employs an ex-ante approach 
and the other an ex-post approach, 
the discount rates applied may dif­
fer because of point-in-time pre­
vailing economic conditions, differ­
ing durations of the period being 
discounted, and even events that 
occurred after the alleged damages 
date. For example, assume a hypo­
thetical damages case involving the 
same 10-year stream of $100,000 
cash flows received at the end of 
each year (note tha t cash flow 
as opposed to net income is the 
appropriate measure to consider). 
Further assume that the damages 
date was December 31, 2003, and 
the date of judgm ent was Decem­
ber 31, 2008. In this case, if the 
cash flows were discounted at a 
risk-free rate, an ex-ante approach 
m ight apply a d iscount rate of 
4.3% (reflecting the then-current 
10-year Treasury no te), whereas 
an ex-post approach might apply 
a discount rate of 1.5% (reflecting 
the then-current 5-year Treasury
Pretax cash flow $10,000
/  (1 + after tax discount rate) (1 +13%) = $ 8,850 Taxable damages award
Pretax cash flow $10,000
X (1 -  tax rate) (1-35%) = $ 6,500 (after tax cash flow)
/  (1 + after-tax discount rate) (1+13%) = $ 5,752
/  (1 -  tax rate) (1-35%) = $ 8,850 Taxable damages award
The following example illustrates how applying a pretax discount rate to a 
pretax cash flow results in an incorrect answer.
Pretax cash flow $10,000
/  (1 + pretax discount rate) (1+20%) =$8,333
note). Although the same reference 
instrum ent was used for selecting 
the discount rate and the only dif­
ference was the term, the expert 
should be aware of the significant 
implications these approaches may 
have on a discount rate and conse­
quently the damages computation. 
In particu lar, the p rejudgm en t 
interest rates will take on increased 
relevance.
Another fact to consider is that, 
generally, an award of lost profits is 
taxable to the plaintiff. Therefore, 
lost profits calculations are usually 
prepared on a pretax basis. Because 
the goal is to make the plaintiff 
whole, the expert needs to consider 
the effect of taxes on the damages 
award. As a result, the appropriate 
discount rate to apply to pretax cash 
flows is the after-tax rate. If using 
an after-tax cash flow, the expert 
can apply an after-tax discount rate 
and then will need to gross up the 
after-tax amount for taxes that will 
need to be paid. The following table 
compares an after-tax discount rate 
applied to a pretax cash flow versus 
an after-tax cash flow.
Assumptions:
Pretax cash flow—$10,000 
Pretax discount rate—20%
After-tax discount rate—13%
Tax rate—35%
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Paragraphs 130-133 of AICPA 
Practice Aid 06-4 provide additional 
information about the implications 
of taxes on discount rates.
CPAS ARE UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO 
DETERMINE DISCOUNT RATES
A uniform methodology for deter­
mining discount rates has not been 
established. However, CPAs have 
a unique com bination of educa­
tion and business experience that 
provides a basis for developing
discount rates. The resources avail­
able to CPAs, including the detailed 
guidance provided in AICPA Prac­
tice Aids and other publications, 
enhance the reliability of informa­
tion and methodologies employed. 
CPAs should use this background 
to ensure that the specific circum­
stances of a matter are adequately 
reflected in a damages com puta­
tion, including in the discount rate. 
For these reasons, we believe that 
strong evidence suggests that the
courts should accept CPA experts 
because they bring reasonable judg­
ments and knowledge to perform 
these calculations, including deter­
m ination of an appropriate  dis­
count rate.
Craig M. Enos, CPA/ABV/CFF, CFE, is a 
partner with the forensic accounting firm 
of Ueltzen & Company, LLP in Sacramento, 
CA. (www.ueltzen.com). Greg Regan, MBA, 
CPA/CFF, CFE, is a director in the litiga­
tion and forensic consulting practice of 
Hemming Morse, Inc. in San Francisco, CA. 
(www.hemming.com).
MARK YOUR CALENDAR
For November 15-17, 2009, the dates of the AICPA 
National Business Valuation Conference at the San Fran­
cisco Marriott Hotel in downtown San Francisco, CA. This 
conference:
• provides 22 hours of continuing education credits
• presents practical solutions to real world valuation 
issues
• includes the profession’s most prominent and eminent 
thought leaders as speakers
• allows you to network with other practitioners and with 
the conference speakers
• offers four different specialized conference tracks
For more information and to register, go to www.cpa2biz. 
com/conferences.
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